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This seventh survey covers the legislative changes to our Workmen's
Compensation Act1 which were adopted by the 1967 session of the Florida
Legislature and all reported judicial decisions since publication of the last
survey.
2
The 1967 Legislature effectuated little change in our Workmen's
Compensation Act. The principal modification was in increasing the maxi-
mum weekly benefits from $42.00 per week to $49.00 per week,' effective
December 31, 1967, and in placing a dollar limitation on death benefits
payable which, in effect, deprives the recipients of death benefits of the
beneficial increases established by the increase in weekly maximum dollar
benefits payable. 4 The trier of fact, previously entitled "Deputy Commis-
* Member of the Florida Bar.
1. FLA. STAT. ch. 440 (1967).
2. The last survey covered the 1965 session of the Florida Legislature and judicial de-
cisions reported from Volume 151, SOUTHERN REPORTER 2d Series up to and including Vol-
ume 175, SOUTHERN REPORTER 2d Series. This survey covers those reported decisions begin-
ning with Volume 176, SOUTHERN REPORTER 2d Series up to and including Volume 198,
SOUTHERN REPORTER 2d Series. For prior survey articles, see Burton, Florida Workmen's
Compensation-1935-1950, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 74 (1950); Clements, Workmen's Compensation, 8
MIAMI L.Q. 469 (1954); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation-1954-1959, 14 U. MIA. I L.
REV. 154 (1959); Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 216 (1961);
Schroll, Workmen's Compensation, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV. 398 (1963); Schroll, Workmen's
Compensation, 20 U. MIA. L. REV. 277 (1965).
3. FLA. STAT. § 440.12(2)(3) (1967).
4. FLA, STAT. § 440.16(2) (1967).
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sioner," received a change of title by the 1967 Legislature and is now
called "Judge of Industrial Claims."' Along with the change of title,
Deputy Commissioners were granted a salary increase to 17,500 dollars
effective July, 1, 1967,6 and were relieved of the obligation of including
reasons or justification for the mandate contained in their orders.7 Salary
changes were also effectuated for the two members of the Full Commis-
sion other than the Chairman.'
One hundred ten judicial opinions were handed down by the Supreme
Court of Florida and the district courts of appeal during the period sur-
veyed. During the same period, an additional 282 orders of the Full Com-
mission were brought to the Supreme Court of Florida by petition for writ
of certiorari which the court declined to grantY The subject matter cov-
ered by this survey will again be presented by topics rather than by the
chronological ordering of cases.
I. SPECIAL DISABILITY FUND
The Special Disability Fund' received little interpretation during
the period surveyed. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company v.
Florida Industrial Commission and Special Disability Fund," an em-
ployee having a pre-existing loss of sight in the left eye sustained an acci-
dent resulting in twenty-five percent permanent partial orthopedic dis-
ability. The claimant was found to be permanently and totally disabled as
a result of the twenty-five percent orthopedic disability, coupled with per-
manent total psychiatric disability. The psychiatric disability was in part
attributable to a subsequent loss of vision in the right eye which reduced
the claimant to total blindness. In reversing the denial of reimbursement
from the Special Disability Fund, the court found that the loss of vision
in each eye separately remained a contributing factor in total blindness
and a causative factor in producing the psychiatric disability with which
the disability attributable to the current injury merged. The employer,
having had knowledge of the pre-existing left eye blindness, was held to
be entitled to resort to the Special Disability Fund for reimbursement.
In Kirkman v. Owens-Illinois Forest Products,'2 an employee was
found to be permanently and totally disabled as a result of two accidents.
The Deputy held the provisions of the Special Disability Fund to be
applicable. On review, the Full Commission reversed, stating that the
5. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(8) (1967).
6. FLA. STAT. § 440.45(3) (1967).
7. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3)(c) (1967).
8. FLA. STAT. § 440.44(2) (1967) ; FLA. STAT. § 443.11(1) (1967).
9. The 1965 survey disclosed that one hundred and ten judicial opinions were handed
down by the Supreme Court of Florida and the district courts of appeal, the supreme court
denying certiorari without opinion in an additional one hundred and fourteen cases.
10. FLA. STAT. § 440.49(4) (1967).
11. 197 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1967).
12. 197 So.2d 822 (Fla. 1967).
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Deputy should have apportioned and awarded disability for the latter
accident alone. In holding that the Full Commission was correct in its
finding that the Special Disability Fund was not applicable, the supreme
court stated that the doctrine of apportionment was not indicated and
therefore, there was no need to resort to the Special Disability Fund. In
this case, full responsibility was imposed upon the employer.13
II. APPORTIONMENT
14
The doctrine of apportionment has undergone drastic judicial revi-
sion during the period surveyed, by virtue of the supreme court's opinion
in the case of Evans v. Florida Industrial Commission." Prior to the
Evans decision, the court had held the doctrine of apportionment to be
applicable to a pre-existing asymptomatic injury suffered in some un-
known or forgotten place and rendered symptomatic by a subsequent
industrial accident, 6 and to an undiagnosed pre-existing arthritic condi-
tion the aggravation of which caused a claimant to be reduced to per-
manent total disability. 7 The facts in the Evans case induced the court to
review many of its prior decisions requiring apportionment where there
are pre-existing disease conditions, as well as many of its earlier decisions
stating that pre-existing conditions need not necessarily require appor-
tionment. All prior decisions inconsistent with the rule of the Evans case
have been modified.
In the Evans case, the claimant injured his back in 1961. After a
period of conservative treatment, he was discharged and returned to work
with no residual disability. Approximately one year later and while in the
same employ, he reinjured his back in a second compensable accident.
After treatment, including surgery, it was determined he had reached
maximum medical improvement with a permanent disability rating of
twenty-five percent of the body as a whole. Claim was filed for both acci-
dents and following hearings, the Deputy Commissioner found the claim-
ant to be permanently and totally disabled and awarded benefits accord-
ingly. On review, the Full Commission reversed the award of permanent
total disability and held that apportionment of the benefits was required.
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court of Florida found there was
competent, substantial evidence to support the award of permanent total
disability and further held apportionment not applicable. The court stated
that the purpose of the apportionment provisions of Florida Statutes, sec-
tion 440.02(19) is to relieve the employer of the obligation for that por-
tion of disability which is not the result of an industrial accident, but
13. The court's decision in the Kirkman case was based on its earlier decision of Ste-
vens v. Winn-Dixie, Case No. 34,131. The Stevens case has not yet been reported in the
SOUTHERN REPORTER series and, as a consequence, is not part of this survey.
14. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1967).
15. 196 So.2d 748, 752 (Fla. 1967).
16. Simmons v. City of Coral Gables, 186 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1966).
17. Milne v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 188 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1966).
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which is in some way attributable to a pre-existing disease or condition in
the medical sense. The court went on to state:
[I]n cases in which a pre-existing disease is aggravated by in-
dustrial injury, the resulting disability, determined as of the time
of the award, is to be considered as falling into three categories:
(1) that which resulted directly and solely from the accident
and which would have occurred even in the absence of the pre-
existing disease; (2) that which resulted from the acceleration
or aggravation of the pre-existing disease by the accident; and
(3) that which resulted from the normal progress of the disease
and would have existed had the accident never occurred. Dis-
ability falling within the first two categories are compensable
under the terms of the Statute. It is the purpose of Section
440.02 (19) to relieve the employer of disability within the third
category by apportioning it out of an award.
Apportionment was thereby held to be proper only when, and to the
extent, a pre-existing disease either, (1) was disabling at the time of the
accident and continued to be so at the time the award is made, or (2) was
producing no disability at the time of the accident but through its normal
progress is doing so at the time permanent disability is determined and an
award is made. The effect of the Evans case is to place full responsibility
on the employer for that disability which the accident caused and to re-
lieve the employer for that degree of disability which is entirely unrelated
to the accident and which was disabling at the time of the accident or be-
came disabling through its natural progression, unaffected by the accident.
If the employer had notice of the pre-existing disability, the claimant
would also receive full benefits by virtue of the provisions of the Special
Disability Fund.
In Thompson v. Swift and Company,18 the question of apportionment
was held not to be one of law, but rather one of fact to be determined by
the Deputy. In Crosby Aeromarine Company v. Wilson, 9 a workman had
sustained a fifteen percent permanent partial disability of his right leg
for which compensation was awarded. The employer and carrier sought
review, contending that eight years prior to the industrial accident giving
rise to the fifteen percent disability of the leg, the same claimant had
sustained an injury to the same leg which resulted in a twenty percent
disability for which he had been paid. In affirming the award, the court
held that no part of the fifteen percent functional impairment present
after the second injury was attributable to the first injury. A similar
award of twenty-five percent disability was affirmed. This did not include
a pre-existing condition of osteo-arthritis which was neither connected
to nor aggravated by the industrial accident.20 The fact that a disabled
18. 198 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1967).
19. 198 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1967).
20. Clark v. Western Knapp Eng'r Co., 190 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1966).
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workman sustains greater disability as a result of either a preceding non-
related disabling condition or a subsequently incurred non-compensable
condition does not preclude an award for the effects of the industrial
injury itself.2
In Jordan v. Florida Industrial Commission," the claimant had
sustained a pre-existing accident resulting in a fractured leg which healed
in an abnormal angle shortening his leg by 2% inches, giving him a limp,
curvature of the spine and abnormal stress on the leg muscles, tendons,
etc. This deformity did not interfere with or prevent adequate perform-
ance of his duties. Subsequently, the claimant suffered a job-connected
accident resulting in a back injury. As a result of the abnormal stress on
his back caused by the earlier leg deformity, claimant's back could not be
properly treated for the latter injury, the only effective treatment being
correction of the pre-existing leg length discrepancy. In reviewing the
denial by the Deputy of medical care for the pre-existing deformity, the
Supreme Court of Florida held that the facts did not depict an aggrava-
tion of a pre-existing injury so as to require apportionment between the
two injuries, but rather that the pre-existing leg deformity retarded and
prevented recovery from a compensable injury. The court reversed the
Full Commission's affirmance of the Deputy's denial of benefits and
ordered the employer to bear the cost of returning the claimant to an em-
ployable status by furnishing him with that degree of compensation and
medical care necessary to effectuate recovery from his back injury includ-
ing correction of the pre-existing deformity.
Apportionment has been denied where there is no evidence to sup-
port apportionment or where it is impossible to utilize the doctrine.2" Pre-
existing psychiatric conditions have also been held not to be subject to the
apportionment doctrine. 4
III. HEART CASES
The requirement of a showing of unusualness of exertion resulting in
heart attacks, established by the rule of Victor Wine25 has been adhered
21. Kurtz v. Walls, 182 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1966); Conrad v. Six L's Packing Co., 182 So.2d
616 (Fla. 1966).
22. 183 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1966).
23. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sutton, 197 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1967); Conrad v. Six L's
Packing Co., 182 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1966) (no evidence of apportionment); G. & L. Motor
Corp. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1966) ; Hastings v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 178 So.2d
106 (Fla. 1965) (impossible to apportion award of death case due to vintricular fibrillation).
24. Warren Barr Supply Co. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1966). Compare with Hard-
ware Mut Cas. Co. v. Sutton, 197 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1967), where the failure to apportion the
claimant's psychiatric disability was affirmed based on insufficient evidence to establish pre-
existing psychiatric condition.
25. Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581, 588 (Fla. 1961), wherein the
court announced the following rule for heart cases:
When disabling heart attacks are involved and where such heart conditions are pre-
cipitated by work connected exertion affecting a pre-existing non-disabling heart
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to by the courts. In Simmons v. Stanley,26 a miocardio-infarction occurred
following the stacking of 100 to 125 cases of canned goods, which, the claim-
ant admitted, was not an unusual exertion for him. An award of compen-
sation was reversed for failure to show unusualness in activity and com-
petent, substantial evidence to support a causal relationship with the
activity itself. Heart attacks caused by exertion in pushing an automobile
for an employee customarily engaged in sedentary employment, 27 and
attacks produced by unusual activity accompanied by unusual climatic
conditions have also been held compensable.28 The unusualness of the
activity is a question for the trier of fact to determine. In Hastings v.
City o1 Fort Lauderdale Fire Department,29 a city fireman was engaged
in a large fire drill. Near the end of the drill, the claimant was found lying
along side of the fire truck. No one saw him fall, but circumstances in-
dicated he had fallen from the cab of the truck while engaged in backing
the truck and holding open the left door. Approximately thirty minutes
after he was found, the claimant was pronounced dead upon arrival at a
hospital. On review, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the Deputy
Commissioner's finding of unusualness in the activity producing the heart
attack. The opinion, however, was not unanimous. The dissenting member
of the court thought that the Victor Wine Rule was not adhered to in
that there was no showing of unusualness in the activity. The majority
opinion gave judicial recognition to medical distinctions in "heart cases"
and noted that the Victor Wine Rule came about in a heart case where
the disability was due to a coronary occlusion, whereas the death in the
instant case was the result of ventricular fibrillation or arrhythmia. Al-
though emphasis was placed on the medical distinction, the opinion does
not reflect the relevancy thereof to the Victor Wine Rule or to the doc-
trine of apportionment in that unusualness in the activity was found to
have occurred and it was impossible to utilize the doctrine of apportion-
ment under the testimony.
Heart attacks not caused by the original accident but which are the
natural and direct result of the initial injury were held compensable where
the initial injury was due to heat prostration or exhaustion,"0 and where
the initial accident produced a back injury and respiratory difficulties
which combined with anxiety occasioned by anticipation of spinal surgery
to cause, in part, a heart attack."' However, in Apgar & Markham Con-
struction Company v. Golden,2 an unbroken chain of causation for a
disease, injuries are compensable only if the employee was at the time subject to un-
usual strain or over-exertion not routine to the type of work he was accustomed to
performing.
26. 197 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1967).
27. G. & L. Motor Corp. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1966).
28. Peltier v. H.H. Barbour, 190 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1966).
29. 178 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1965).
30. Petitt v. Ben F. Walker Framing Co., 176 So.2d 897 (Fla. 1965).
31. Herrin Transp. Co. v. Cothren, 180 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1965).
32. 190 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1966).
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claimant's heart disability was not found to exist due to the illusory
nature of the evidence bearing on causal connection. In that case, a back
injury occurred on May 27th, and on June 17th the claimant was picked
up on a city street in a comatose condition and admitted to a hospital
where he was found to have suffered a heart attack. The evidence which
attributed the heart attack to the back injury was based solely on the
claimant's testimony of economic anxiety which followed his back injury.
The court held that under the circumstances of the case, the heart attack
was indirect rather than direct and declined to find -the heart attack com-
pensable based solely upon economic anxiety. The evidence disclosed that
the majority of the claimant's anxiety occurred following the heart attack
rather than during the short period of time which passed between his back
injury and the attack itself.
IV. DISABILITY BENEFITS3"
A. Occupational Diseases
In Richardson v. Honeywell, Inc.,34 a claimant had sustained a con-
dition diagnosed as capsulitis which the Deputy Commissioner found was
caused by repeated stretching and stress to the claimant's right ankle
while operating a vacuum pedal with her right foot. He awarded compen-
sation based on the theory that the condition was the result of an oc-
cupational disease. On review, the Full Commission reversed the award as
a matter of law, concluding that the claimant sustained neither an ac-
cident nor an occupational disease. The decision of the Full Commission
was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida without opinion.'-
Skin cancers produced as a result of exposure to the sun by a claimant
employed as a life guard were found compensable by the Deputy Com-
missioner under the occupational disease theory. On review, they were
found not compensable by the Full Commission. The Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed the decision of the Full Commission, stating:
In affirming the Order on this point, we note that our affirmance
is limited to the particular facts of this case. We are not an-
nouncing here a general rule of law applicable to all skin cancer
cases or excluding the possibility they may be compensable oc-
cupational diseases in particular Workmen's Compensation
cases."
36
An award of compensation for a dermatitis condition under the oc-
33. FLA. STAT. § 440.15 (1967).
34. 188 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1966).
35. The facts in this case may be obtained from the dissenting opinion of Justice Paul
D. Barns who felt the claimant's condition was compensable. Richardson v. Honeywell, Inc.,
188 So.2d 303, 304 (Fla. 1966).
36. Braden v. City of Hialeah, 177 So.2d 235, 236 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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cupational disease sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act was also
reversed for lack of competent substantial evidence to support the award
in Screen Art Posters, Inc. v. Quinn.7 In this case, it is interesting to note
that the court pointed out that the award of disability itself was unsup-
ported by the record inasmuch as the claimant had not suffered any loss
of capacity to earn wages in any other work which he could perform. 8
B. Temporary Benefits
In Chastain v. Union News Division of the American News Com-
pany, 9 the reversal of an award of permanent total disability was upheld
where a claimant had reached maximum medical recovery from her
orthopedic injuries but continued to be temporarily disabled and in need
of medical care as a result of a psychiatric disorder diagnosed as a con-
version neurosis.
The statutory minimum of eight dollars per week4" was held to be
applicable to temporary partial disability awards in Crosby Aeromarine
Company v. Wilson.4
C. Permanent Benefits : Scheduled Injuries
The method of determining the amount of compensation where
phalanges of a digit or parts thereof are lost due to an industrial accident
under Florida Statutes, section 440.15 (3) was set forth in the case of
Fernandez v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.42 In that case, it was held that where
compensation is sought for loss of use of a phalange, it must be measured
in terms of loss of use of the finger or toe, not the phalange. Loss of the
first and any part of the second phalange merits compensation for loss
of the entire digit. When half or more of a distal phalange is lost, the
court went on to state that the statutory fifty percent rule would be in-
voked.
An award of permanent total disability resulting from two scheduled
injuries was reversed in Dixie Lime and Stone Company v. Lot,4 3 because
of the claimant's failure to make legitimate efforts to obtain employment.
37. 198 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1967).
38. FLA. STAT. § 440.151(3) (1967) defines disablement as becoming actually incapaci-
tated partially or totally because of occupational disease from performing work in the last
occupation in which injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease. "Disability" means
the state of being so incapacitated. The opinion in Screen Art Posters, Inc. v. Quinn, 198
So.2d 324 (Fla. 1967), indicates disability to be considered in .terms of any work rather than
inability to perform the last work in which the occupational disease was incurred.
39. 194 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1966).
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.12(2) (1967).
41. 198 So.2d 15 (Fla. 1967).
42. 197 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1967).
43. 196 SQ.2d 422 (Fla. 1967).
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D. Permanent Benefits: Wage-Earning-Capacity Loss Cases
The majority of the wage earning capacity loss cases decided in the
period surveyed were governed by case law prior to the 1965 amendment
to Florida Statutes, section 440.15(3) (u). This amendment obviated
much of the litigation which took place where there was a permanent
physical impairment resulting from an industrial accident, but the claim-
ant was able to earn the same or greater wages, even with the permanent
physical impairment. A sustained work record of earnings substantially
equivalent to that received prior to the accident was held to necessitate a
finding of no permanent disability, 44 while in other decisions, it was held
that earnings of the same or greater wages subsequent to an injury was
only one factor to be considered with others in determining loss of wage
earning capacity.45 The difference between wage earning capacity loss
and medical disability was emphasized in the case Qf Maldonado v. Keller
Metal Products,46 wherein the claimant was held to be entitled to spinal
surgery which would not improve his medical disability, but which would
improve his wage earning capacity.
Five cases were reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida wherein
the issue was permanent total disability. Permanent total disability was
denied in two cases where the employee made no real attempt to find
work.4 A thirty-eight-year-old exotic dancer who lost one leg as a result
of an accident, who was sick and depressed and deprived of her means of
earning a livelihood, was held to be permanently and totally disabled48
as were two claimants who were suffering from twenty-five percent physi-
cal impairments. 9
V. MEDICAL BENEFITS
Medical benefits have been extended to include treatment for pre-
existing deformaties 0 not aggravated by industrial accident but whose
existence precludes the healing of the compensable injury." Under certain
circumstances, out-of-state medical care has been held appropriate as
have been awards for unskilled nursing care. 2
44. Oliveros Motor Serv., Inc. v. Libert, 184 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1960). Pratt & Whitney
Aircraft v. Golas, 192 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1966) (functional disability prior to the 1965 amend-
ment held to be insufficient as sole basis of determining disability).
45. Kurtz v. Wall, 182 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1966) ; Kuhle v. Kirak, 177 So.2d 324 (Fla. 1965).
46. 185 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1966).
47. Dixie Lime & Stone Co. v. Lott, 196 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1967); Clark v. Western
Knapp Eng'r Co., 190 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1966).
48. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sutton, 197 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1967).
49. Evans v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 196 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1967); Creighton v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 190 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1966).
50. Jordan v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 183 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1966).
51. Howell v. Cottage-Ette Mfg. Co., 186 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1966).
52. Henley v. Central Truck Lines, Inc., 178 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1965). See, Reynolds v.
Florida Mobile Homes, Inc., 195 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1966), where the court remanded the cause
to the Full Commission to determine the propriety of the Deputy Commissioner's findings
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It is the responsibility of the employer to furnish medical benefits.
Where the employee arranges for treatment by himself, he cannot recover
for the cost of said treatment unless he has given the employer the op-
portunity to do so and he has declined.5" A physician who treats an injured
workman but fails to file medical reports with the Florida Industrial
Commission within ten days following the first treatment will not recover
payment of his billing from the employer or carrier, it having been held
that the injured workman shares the responsibility with the physician to
see to it that the ten-day filing rule, under Florida Statutes, section 440.13
is complied with.5 4 The ten-day filing requirement has been held to be
subject to the doctrine of waiver."5
Once medical billings have been placed into evidence, it is the obliga-
tion of the Judge of Industrial Claims to determine the responsibility





The statutory exclusion removing agricultural farm laborers from
coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Act was limited in the case
of Thomas Smith Farms v. Alday.55 In that case, a claimant was injured
when he fell from a mule barn he was constructing for his employer, a
corporate farmer engaged primarily in growing tobacco. The claimant
was a full-time employee hired to repair buildings and tenant houses and
to erect new buildings on the farm. He had also engaged in non-carpentry
work in the tobacco barn for more than sixty hours during the year.
Emphasizing liberal construction, the court affirmed the holding of the
Full Commission which reversed a denial of benefits to the claimant. The
commission had stated:
It is the character of the labor performed by the employee that
must determine its application [the exemption] rather than the
character of the employer's business.
The dual purpose doctrine utilized in determining coverage of em-
ployees on the highways again came into focus during the period surveyed.
Injuries were held compensable where they resulted from an accident on
a trip which was serving both a personal and business purpose,59 but not
that the Workmen's Compensation Act authorized recovery for nursing where the nature of
the injury required such, and the employer had knowledge thereof but refused to provide
the care.
53. Hood's Dairy v. Severino, 178 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1965).
54. St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Feinberg, 192 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1966); Hood's Dairy v.
Severino, 178 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1965).
55. Geiger Distribs., Inc. v. Snow, 186 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1966).
56. Fluellen v. Santini Bros. Inc., 195 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1967); Pratt & Whitney v. Golas,
192 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1966).
57. FaA. STAT. § 440.02(1)(c)(3) (1967).
58. 182 So.2d 405, 406 (Fla. 1966).
59. Levine v. Builders Aluminum Stone Co., 186 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1966).
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compensable where the alleged business purpose was trivial,6 ° and without
the scope of coverage where a deviation occurred.61
The tests for determining whether or not an employer-employee re-
lationship exists and whether there will, as a result, be coverage under the
Workmen's Compensation Act was set forth in detail in the case of Cantor
v. Cockran.62 Among the tests mentioned were control, including the
power to fire; whether the one employee was engaged in a distinct oc-
cupation or business; the kind of occupation with reference to its super-
vision; the skill required; whether the employer or workman supplied the
tools and place of employment; the length of employment; the method
of payment; whether the work is part of the regular business of the em-
ployer; whether or not the parties believe they have created the relation of
master and servant and whether the principal is or is not in business. In
the Cantor case, the claimant was engaged in assisting customers in trans-
porting their groceries from the point where the customer paid for gro-
ceries to the customer's car or truck. It was on one of these trips that the
claimant sustained an injury when a trunk lid fell across his back. Using
the tests set forth above, the parties were found to have created the re-
lationship of employer and employee, thereby extending coverage to the
claimant.
An attempt to deny coverage to a police academy trainee for alleged
misrepresentation of a pre-existing condition on his employment applica-
tion was denied in the case of Simmons v. City of Coral Gables. 3 The
basis for the denial was that there was no reason for the claimant to sus-
pect he was suffering a disability when he completed the application forms.
A similar result was reached where the claimant was an uneducated negro
man, unable to read and write the employment application was filled out
by the employee's foreman. It was found that the claimant did not know
the representation to be false.64
The question of whether accidents had occurred was considered in
Howard v. Department of Public Safety.6" A Florida Highway Patrolman
was found to have suffered an accident when, while lifting a heavy bat-
tery and container from the ground to a Highway Patrol car, the claimant
noticed a slight pain of which he made no complaint. A police academy
trainee was found to have suffered an accident where the circumstances
surrounding his work and the rigid training requirements were causative
factors which permitted a pre-existing condition to become symptomatic
60. Everett Ford Co. v. Laney, 189 So.2d 877 (Fla. 1966).
61. Maroney v. Kelly & Sons, Inc., 195 So.2d 208 (Fla. 1967).
62. 184 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1966). See also Alter Sales Co. v. Sykes, 190 So.2d 746 (Fla.
1966) (court applied a three-way test in determining employer and employee relationships).
63. 186 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1966).
64. Aron v. Kirk's Lawn Serv., 190 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1966).
65. 187 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1966).
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even though he may have suffered the same result in a variety of other
situations.6"
The vexing question of jurisdiction where workmen are injured under
circumstances which may afford them coverage under the Florida Work-
men's Compensation Act or under one of the federal acts was touched upon
in the case of Atlas Iron and Metal Company v. Hesser.67 After reviewing
the somewhat conflicting federal decisions, the court quoted the following
from a Massachusetts decision of earlier years:
Probably, therefore, our proper course is not to attempt to rea-
son the matter through and to reconcile previous authorities, or
to preserve fine lines of distinction, but rather simply to recog-
nize the futility of attempting to reason logically about 'il-
logic'....
The federal act was held applicable because the Supreme Court had ex-
tended it to the full scope of federal maritime jurisdiction.
VII. AVERAGE WEEKLY WAGE
The determination of an average weekly wage is governed by the
several standards prescribed by Florida Statutes, section 440.14. When a
factual situation in a given case fits a particular statutory standard, the
latter should govern to the exclusion of any contrary quasi-judicial dis-
cretion. In Jones Shutter Products, Inc. v. Jackson,68 a workman sustained
an injury while helping to install hurricane shutters. He was employed in
this endeavor for only one day. He maintained regular employment in a
dissimilar industry. It was stipulated between the parties that if the aver-
age weekly wage of a similar employee applied, the average rate
would be one dollar to one dollar and twenty-five cents per hour.
In affirming the reversal of a Deputy Commissioner's award, finding
claimant's average weekly wage to be ten dollars, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the claimant was not a part-time employee, that the
wages he earned in the concurrent dissimilar employment could not be
used in determining average weekly wage and that the stipulated wage of
a similar employee should be used as the wage base in determining aver-
age weekly wage.
The question of whether earnings from concurrent dissimilar employ-
ment, properly excluded from average weekly wage, may nevertheless be
considered in determining post-recovery earning capacity was decided in
the case of Parrott v. City of Fort Lauderdale.69 In that case, the claim-
66. Simmons v. City of Coral Gables, 186 So.2d 493 (Fla. 1966). For a dissenting
opinion wherein coverage was denied for lack of a showing of an accident or occupational
disease, see Richardson v. Honeywell, Inc., 188 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1966).
67. 177 So.2d 199, 202 (Fla. 1965). For another jurisdictional dispute involving cov-
erage, see Sikes v. Fort Myers Constr. Co., 191 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1966).
68. 185 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1966).
69. 190 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1966). The opinion in this case contains an excellent review of
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ant suffered a compensable injury while employed as a garbage collector,
in which employment he had an average weekly wage of about sixty-two
dollars. He also had concurrent seasonal earnings of seventy-five to one
hundred dollars per week from self-employment. The Deputy Commis-
sioner found the employments to be too dissimilar to be combined for
purposes of determining average weekly wage. In awarding disability
benefits, the Deputy Commissioner considered the factor that the claim-
ant was able to continue in his self-employment activities, but not able to
continue to do the lifting required in his employment as a garbage col-
lector. In reversing the Deputy Commissioner, the court held that if earn-
ings from concurrent employment are excluded for determination of
average weekly wage, earnings from that same employment should also
be excluded from determination of post-recovery earning capacity. The
court went on to caution that greater participation in the concurrent dis-
similar employment in the post-recovery period may be considered in
determining post-recovery earning capacity loss.
VIII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The furnishing of medical treatment after an order has been entered
is insufficient to toll the running of the statute of limitations insofar as the
compensation or money benefits are concerned. If more than two years
pass after the last payment of compensation pursuant to an order, a
further claim for compensation benefits will be barred.7° In those in-
stances where the attending physician discharges a claimant from active
medical care, but again wishes to see the claimant for a re-examination
at some future date, said future re-examination will be considered part of
a continuation of the remedial treatment for the purposes of tolling the
statute of limitations.
7'
In Melbourne Airways & Air College, Inc. v. Thompson,72 a widow
filed a claim for death benefits on her own behalf as well as on behalf of
the minor children of the deceased. The claim was filed more than two
years after the date of death. An award of compensation benefits to the
minor children and denial of the claim of the widow, based on the run-
ning of the statute of limitations, was affirmed. The assertion of the widow
that her claim was filed within two years from the "official" establishment
of her husband's death was held insufficient.
IX. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
The Deputy Commissioner, now called Judge of Industrial Claims,
has the sole duty and responsibility to ascertain the facts through hear-
the court's prior decisions regarding the combining of wages from concurrent employment
for average weekly wage purposes.
70. Jones v. Ludlum Corp., 190 So.2d 760 (Fla. 1966).
71. Mansell v. Mulberry Constr. Co., 196 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1967).
72. 190 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1966).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
ings, make findings and enter his compensation order.78 He must con-
sider all factors, make adequate findings based upon the record before
him and adequately resolve the meritorious issues and defenses pre-
sented.7 Findings which are not sufficiently clear, findings which fail to
properly substantiate the order and findings which are general rather than
particular are insufficient.75
Where there is conflict in the evidence, the Deputy Commissioner's
rulings on these conflicts will not be disturbed if supported by competent,
substantial evidence. The Deputy is the undisputed trier of facts and his
province will not be invaded. The rule, giving conclusive correctness to
the Deputy's findings on disputed facts does not, however, carry with it a
presumption of infallibility as to the conclusions he may have drawn
from the facts found by him to be proved. 78 A presumption supports the
original findings, but the power or prerogative of the Deputy with refer-
ence to resolving conflicts, is not absolute and is always subject to review
by the Full Commission and the supreme court. However, those findings
will not be disturbed unless the reviewing authority becomes convinced
that the Deputy has gone afield.
In the selection of medical testimony and where there is a clear con-
flict, the Deputy Commissioner has the discretionary right to accept the
testimony of one doctor over that of one or more of his colleagues. This
discretion must be rooted in a firm foundation of fact to support the opinion
of the expert upon whom the Deputy chooses to rely.77 In addition, the
cases require the Deputy to explain his reasons for accepting the testimony
of one qualified physician over the testimony of another.78
It is also the responsibility of Deputy Commissioners to adjudicate
issues properly presented to them,79 and to refrain from entering orders
without testimony or other evidentiary support.80
73. Milne v. Florida Indus. Corm'n, 188 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1966); Warren Barr Supply
Co. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1966); Crowell v. Messana Contractors, 180 So.2d 329
(Fla. 1965).
74. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Golas, 192 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1966); Hammersla v. Price,
190 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1966); Milne v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 188 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1966);
Kurtz v. Wall, 182 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1966); Conrad v. Six L's Packing Co., 182 So.2d 616
(Fla. 1966) ; Vandiner v. Watford, 178 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1965).
75. Outrigger Inn v. Reser, 198 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1967); Scott v. Grondlin Remodeling Co.,
178 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1965); Garcia v. Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 176 So.2d 329 (Fla.
1965).
76. Gladsten County Bd. of Pub. Instr. v. Dickson, 191 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1966); Ann-
heuser-Busch, Inc., v. Redner, 198 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1967); Peltier v. H.H. Barbour, 190
So.2d 569 (Fla. 1966).
77. Crowell v. Messana Contractors, 180 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1965) (court not convinced
that Deputy went so far afield in his analysis of what was said by doctors so as to justify
interference with the findings); Geiger Distribs., Inc. v. Snow, 186 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1966);
Herrin Transp. Co. v. Gothren, 180 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1965).
78. St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Feinberg, 192 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1966); Gonci v. Panelfab
Prods., Inc., 179 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1956) (credibility of witnesses also to be determined by the
Deputy Commissioner).
79. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Golis, 192 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1966).
80. Bilton v. Bilton, 181 So.2d 533 (Fla. 1965).
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In Kirk v. Publix Super Markets,8 1 a claimant was ordered to submit
to a physical examination and to produce copies of the reports of physi-
cians who had previously examined and treated him. Upon the claimant's
refusal to produce the copies of the physicians' reports, the Deputy Com-
missioner entered an order denying the claim and dismissing it without
prejudice. The order further required that no consideration would be
given to any new claim until the claimant complied with the order to
produce. In reversing the Deputy's dismissal of the claim, it was held by
the Supreme Court of Florida that the Deputy had no such authority but
that he would have to seek enforcement of his order through the circuit
court, which court, after hearing evidence, could punish for contempt.
The Deputy has quasi-judicial discretion to hear additional testimony on
remands if the order remanding the matter does not preclude the Deputy
from so doing. 2
X. THE FULL COMMISSION
In its function as a appellate review body, the Full Commission has
the duty of determining whether the Deputy Commissioner properly ful-
filled his function with reference to the evidence supporting the findings
and the law applied to the findings. Questions of fact cannot be changed
into questions of law in order to skirt the competent substantial evidence
rule supporting Deputy Commissioners' orders.83 The Full Commission
must adhere to the findings of fact made by the Deputy Commissioner
unless there is no competent substantial evidence to support them. 4
Questions directly raised in an application for review before the Full
Commission must be dealt with by the Full Commission and their failure
to do so is error.85 Indication was given in Milne v. Florida Industrial
Commission"0 that the Full Commission must evaluate the existence of
competent substantial evidence. It is questionable whether the customary
practice of short-form orders fulfills the duty imposed upon the Full Com-
mission to determine whether the Deputy Commissioner properly fulfilled
his function with reference to the evidence required to support the findings
and the law applied to the findings. 7
81. 185 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
82. Barber v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 195 So.2d 557 (Fla. 1967); Outrigger Inn v.
Reser, 198 So.2d 28 (Fla. 1967) ; Griffin v. Jarvis Pharmacy, 197 So.2d 821 (Fla. 1967).
83. Thompson v. Swift & Co., 198 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1967); Peltier v. H.H. Barbour, 190
So.2d 569 (Fla. 1966) ; Hastings v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 178 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1965).
84. Evans v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 196 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1967) (substituted its view
and judgment for that of the Deputy) ; Fleischer's Inc. v. Bryant, 196 So.2d 418 (Fla. 1967)
(Commission redetermined the issues which was beyond the scope of its authority) ; Ham-
mersla v. Price, 190 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1966) (substituted its judgment for the facts for those of
the Deputy Commissioner) ; Creighton v. Sears-Roebuck & Co., 190 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1966) ;
Warren Barr Supply Co. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1966); Crowell v. Messana Con-
tractors, 180 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1965).
85. Barnes v. International Paper Co., 184 So.2d 168 (Fla. 1966).
86. 188 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1966).
87. Thompson v. Swift & Co., 198 So.2d 826 (Fla. 1967) (duty set forth) ; Warren Barr
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XI. REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT
Judicial review of Industrial Commission orders has not changed."8
Final orders of the Full Commission are reviewable only by the Supreme
Court of Florida, which limits the scope of its review to a determination
of whether or not the Commission properly fulfilled its function with
reference to the evidence required to support the findings made by the
Deputy and the law applied to the findings. 9
XII. MODIFICATION
Little activity has transpired in the period surveyed regarding modi-
fications of prior Workmen's Compensation awards. In Maldonado v.
Keller Metal Products, ° modification was permitted for a claimant whose
medical disability could not be improved through requested surgery, but
whose wage-earning capacity could be improved as a result thereof. In
bodily injury cases prior to the 1965 amendment of Florida Statutes, sec-
tion 440.15(3) (u), modification could be had only where there was a
showing of increased loss of wage earning capacity. 9'
XIII. ATTORNEYS' FEES
Entitlement to attorneys' fees, to be assessed against the employer or
carrier for claimant's attorney, is contingent upon a showing of some
service to claimant. Without such a showing, attorneys' fees are not
awardable.92 In Steel v. A.D.H. Building Contractors," attorneys' fees
were found to be assessable against an employer and carrier in enforce-
ment proceedings in the circuit court pursuant to a rule nisi and also as-
sessable in the appellate proceedings in the district court of appeal to
review the circuit court's ruling on the rule nisi.
Awards of attorneys' fees in the amount of 5,200 dollars in a per-
manent total disability award, 4 4,250 dollars in a death claim 5 and
Supply Co. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1966) (lengthy Order of Commission affirming
Deputy commended); Scott v. Grondlin Remodeling Co., 178 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1965) (helpful if
Commission would specifically outline its reasons for reversal of Deputy).
88. See prior surveys cited note 2 supra.
89. Hammersla v. Price, 190 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1966) (court will not review the evidence to
formulate a set of factual findings) ; Garcia v. Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 176 So.2d
329 (Fla. 1965). See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Redner, 198 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1967).
90. 185 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1966).
91. Cheathem v. The Fruit Bowl, Inc., 194 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1966) (weak factual situation
justified reversal of modification award) ; Tropical Brick Co., Inc. v. Jackson, 188 So.2d 289
(Fla. 1966).
92. Clark v. Western Knapp Eng'r Co., 190 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1966) (recovery of medical
expense sufficient to justify assessment of attorney's fees) ; Accord, Mansell v. Mulberry
Constr. Co., 196 So.2d 436 (Fla. 1967); Poyntz v. William Adeimy, Inc., 190 So.2d 745 (Fla.
1966) (attorney's fee assessable for obtaining payment of medical expert witness fee);
Drum v. Pure Oil Co., 184 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1966).
93. 196 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1967).
94. Warren Barr Supply Co. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 14 (Fla. 1966).
95. Hastings v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 178 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1965).
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15,000 dollars in a permanent total award were found not to be excessive
under the circumstances of the particular casesY6
XIV. WAIVER
Only two cases utilizing the doctrine of waiver or estoppel were de-
cided in the period surveyed. In the first case, an employer was found to
have waived the defense of non-coverage and was estopped to raise it
when the employer brought the claimant to the United States and offered
to furnish medical treatment pursuant to the Florida Workmen's Compen-
sation Act which was in fact furnished.9 7 In the second case, it was held
that the requirement to furnish medical reports within ten days was
waived where the employer knew of respondent's injury and took him to
the treating doctor, knew and acquiesced in the original treatment, the
resumption of the treatment and the second resumption of treatment."
XV. PENALTIES
Where penalties are claimed, a failure to offer evidence to excuse
their assessment will require the assessment of the penalties. 99 However,
penalties for failure to timely pay compensation as distinguished from
payment of an award have been limited to temporary disability benefits
only as distinguished from permanent disability benefits.'
XVI. PROCEDURE
Since the last survey, the procedure in the presentation and handling
of Workmen's Compensation claims has been unchanged. The burden of
proof is upon the claimant to prove causal connection between his em-
ployment and his injury, there being no presumption that the injury for
which compensation is claimed is causally connected with the employ-
ment."°1 In death cases, the fact of death and time of death must be
proved as well as other material facts and they may be established by
circumstantial evidence. The proof of this issue in compensation claims,
as in our civil cases, generally is sufficient if the circumstantial evidence
amounts to a preponderance of all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the circumstances in evidence to the end that the evidence is
96. Ford v. Pesto, 198 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1967) (attorney's fee found high but not grossly
excessive) ; Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Sutton, 197 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1967).
97. Blair v. Gerrits, Inc., 193 So.2d 172 (Fla. 1966). "
98. Geiger Distribs., Inc. v. Snow, 186 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1966).
99. G. & L. Motor Corp. v. Taylor, 182 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1966).
100. Massey v. Haynie, 180 So.2d 331 (Fla. 1965) (the rationale excluding permanent
disability from the operation of penalties because of the difficulty in determining permanent
disability may have been obviated by the 1965 amendment to section 440.15(3) (u)).
101. Gladsen County Bd. of Pub. Instr. v. Dixon, 191 So.2d 562 (Fla. 1966). However,
claimant is not required to prove causal relationship by a preponderance of the evidence,
Simmons v. Stanley, 197 So.2d 514 (Fla. 1967).
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not susceptible to two equally reasonable inferences." 2 The evidence
presented to the Deputy must be of sufficient quality and quantity to
meet the competent substantial evidence test.10 3
Workmen's Compensation claims, as well as petitions for modifica-
tions must contain sufficient information to comply with the statutory re-
quirements so that if the statements contained therein are proven, they
would justify the relief sought. 04 On the other hand, the total failure on
the part of an employer or carrier to file a notice to controvert has been
held not to constitute a default upon which a claim proceeds ex parte.0 5
The utilization of stipulations was again encouraged in the case of
Tropical Brick Company, Inc. v. Jackson.0 6 In that case, the parties
stipulated that the claimant's future medical care would be given by two
specific doctors. Subsequent to the entry of the stipulation, claimant re-
turned to the two doctors, both of whom declined to furnish him medical
care. In a modification proceeding, the Deputy Commissioner ordered the
claimant to receive his further medical care under the direction of physi-
cians other than the two previously stipulated to. In reversing the Deputy
Commissioner, the court pointed out that the stipulation was deserving of
much more weight than was afforded it and had the Deputy followed it
faithfully, he would have come to a contrary result.
In Melbourne Airways & Air College, Inc. v. Thompson,' 17 a claim-
ants deposition was permitted to be used in lieu of her personal appear-
ance at the hearing. In addition, documentary evidence of a federal ad-
ministrative determination of death was also admitted into evidence. In
reviewing the procedure, the court affirmed, stating they could find no
abuse of the Deputy's discretion in his admission of the deposition and
documentary evidence.
At the appellate level, the Commission does not have the power to
order an employer to pay the cost of a transcript furnished to an indigent
claimant by the Commission in the event the claimant prevails on ap-
peal.
0 8
The concept of harmless error in appellate proceedings has been
utilized by the Full Commission and by the Supreme Court of Florida on
two separate occasions during the period surveyed.' 9 In Direct Oil
Corporation v. Brown,"' the court held that it would not review orders of
102. Melbourne Airways & Air College Inc. v. Thompson, 190 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1966).
103. Apgar & Markham Constr. Co. v. G6lden, 190 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1966).
104. Hood's Dairy v. Severino, 178 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1965).
105. St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Feinberg, 192 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1966).
106. 190 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1966).
107. Melbourne Airways & Air College, Inc. v. Thompson, 190 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1966).
108. Parrott v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 190 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1966).
109. Fernandez v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 197 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1967); Milne v. Florida
Indus. Comm'n, 188 So.2d 798 (Fla. 1966).
110. 178 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1965).
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the Full Commission which had not become final and that it would not
review the correctness of the reasoning of the Full Commission's order,
but only the correctness of the order itself. Further, through dictum, in-
dication was given that the Full Commission could not review inter-
locutory orders of its Deputy Commissioners.
The procedure prescribed by the statute for the filing of medical
reports"' has again been subject to interpretation on four different oc-
casions. The court has stated that the claimant shares with the physician
the responsibility of the filing of reports or justifying the failure to do so.
The failure of the Mayo Clinic to file medical reports was initially ex-
cused by the Deputy, but reversed upon review in the case of Hoods
Dairy v. Serverino."2 Because of protracted litigation and a confused
legal situation, the ten-day statutory requirement was excused by the
Deputy Commissioner and affirmed by the court in Hardware Mutual
Casualty Company v. Sharon Sutton."'
XVII. THIRD PARTIES AND SUBROGATION
Various attempts have been made to escape the exclusive remedy
Doctrine of the Workmen's Compensation Act which limits injured em-
ployees to Workmen's Compensation benefits. Citing Holly v. A.G. Wim-
pey,"4 an injured employee attempted to classify a hauler of lime rock
as a materialman. The attempt was denied, the court holding the would-
be defendant a sub-contractor and thus protected by the exclusive remedy
doctrine. Third party lawsuits by an employee of one sub-contractor
against another sub-contractor"' and by injured employees of a general
contractor against a sub-contractor" 6 were similarly dismissed. In Smith
v. Ryder Truck Rentals, Inc.," 7 the plaintiff was injured by a fellow em-
ployee, both of whom were riding on a rented motorcycle which their
employer leased from the would-be defendant. The lawsuit was dismissed
by the court which held that the defendant was not vicariously liable
under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
An injured employee's refusal to accept compensation does not create
a third party liability action against a sub-contractor which the Work-
men's Compensation Act precludes." 8 However, where an injured work-
Ill. FLA. STAT. § 440.13 (1967).
112. 178 So.2d 588 (Fla. 1965). For an opinion as to what does not constitute good
cause, see St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Feinberg, 192 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1966).
113. 197 So.2d 502 (Fla. 1967) ; Geiger Distribs., Inc. v. Snow, 186 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1966)
(10 day rule held waived).
114. 192 So.2d 508. (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966); Vargo v. Carter, 188 So.2d 402 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1966) (driver of a truck leased by its owner to a general contractor held not to be a ma-
teria'lman).
115. Carter v. Simms Crane Serv., Inc., 198 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1967).
116. Shirley v. Asbell, 197 So.2d 828 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
117. 176 So.2d 599 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965), aff'd, 182 So.2d 422 (Fla. 1966).
118. Gross v. Rudy's Stone Co., Inc., 179 $.2d 6Q3 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
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man detrimentally changes his position by failing to file a claim for
Workmen's Compensation in reliance upon a supplier's assertion of no
compensation coverage, the supplier has been held to be estopped from
subsequently raising the exclusiveness of liability provisions of the Work-
men's Compensation Act when a third party action is brought.'19
The fact that the injured workman and would-be defendant are
working on the same project does not make them employees of a com-
mon employer. In Foulk v. Perkins,2 ' the widow of a deceased employee
recovered damages against defendants who were claiming to be statutory
fellow employees of the deceased's employer.
The subrogated interests of a workmen's compensation carrier in a
third party lawsuit has been lost by the failure to timely file a claim of
lien therein. 2' However, the filing of the lien after a verdict and subse-
quent settlement but prior to the filing of a satisfaction of judgment is
sufficient to preserve the subrogated interests." The settlement of a third
party action without notice to the compensation carrier does not destroy
their subrogated interests nor limit them to equitable distribution. 23 In
American Mutual Liability Insurance Company v. City of West Palm
Beach,"4 the workman was injured due to alleged negligence of the City
of West Palm Beach. He was paid Workmen's Compensation benefits by
the workmen's compensation carrier and expressed his desire not to sue
the City of West Palm Beach. One day less than a year from the date of
the accident, the workmen's compensation carrier instituted a lawsuit in
order to recover its subrogated interests. Their right to do so did not ac-
crue until after the one year period. The defendant City of West Palm
Beach, had limited liability and could not be sued after one year. In dis-
missing the lawsuit, the district court of appeal held that compensation
carrier's subrogation rights were limited by statute and that the conflict
in the statutes which, in effect, deprived the carrier of its subrogated
right, though inequitable, was a matter for the legislature.
XVIII. ADDITIONAL DECISIONS OF INTEREST
In Lewis Manufacturing Company v. Brown,2 ' the filing of a Peti-
tion for extension of time, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 3 of the
Florida Industrial Commission Rules of Proedure was held insufficient to
prevent operation of the requirements of Rules 3 and 11.
119. Quality Shell Homes & Supply Co. v. Roley, 186 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
120. 181 So.2d 704 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
121. Cook Motor Co. v. Vaughn, 189 So.2d 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
122. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 193 So.2d 446 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
123. Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 190 So.2d 426 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1966).
124. 185 So.2d 174 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
125. 198 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1967).
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In Shell v. City of Miami, 6 the City of Miami adopted a procedure
whereby it paid its injured employees full salary during temporary total
disability. All salary payments made over and above the compensation due
for the particular weeks of temporary disability were designated as "ad-
vance payments" of compensation. Upon determination that the employee
had a permanent disability, the "advance payments" were applied as a
credit against the permanent disability. In accordance with the prevailing
view of courts when constructing similar provisions, the court struck the
procedure and limited the credit of "advance payments" to payments in
the amount of, and within, the time for disability compensation of that
class ultimately found to be due.
XIV. CONCLUSION
The two year period surveyed has brought little legislative or judicial
change to the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act. The doctrine of ap-
portionment has undergone drastic judicial revision which should eventu-
ally reduce litigation for those employees suffering from pre-existing im-
pairments or diseases.
The pressing workload of the Supreme Court of Florida is reflected
in the increased number of Workmen's Compensation cases where peti-
tions for writ or certiorari are denied without opinion. It is foreseeable
that new methods of judicial review will ultimately become necessary
should the workload of the Court not diminish.
126. 193 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1966).
